Amos Perlmutter offers a revisionist account of Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy, arguing that FDR badly misread Stalin’s long‑term ambitions and conceded too much in key negotiations over Eastern Europe, Germany, and the postwar order. Drawing on newly available Soviet and U.S. archival material, he portrays the alliance as “not so grand”: a partnership that helped win the war but, in his view, strengthened Soviet power and contributed to the shape of the Cold War.
Amos Perlmutter offers a revisionist account of Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy, arguing that FDR badly misread Stalin’s long‑term ambitions and conceded too much in key negotiations over Eastern Europe, Germany, and the postwar order. Drawing on newly available Soviet and U.S. archival material, he portrays the alliance as “not so grand”: a partnership that helped win the war but, in his view, strengthened Soviet power and contributed to the shape of the Cold War.
